

PROPOSED RECOGNITION OF THE VIETCONG

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, there has been much talk in recent days, in this body and out of it, about recognizing the Vietcong and offering it participation in the Government of South Vietnam. But this is not what the North Vietnamese, the masters of the National Liberation Front in the South, are after. They insist, as the Washington Post points out in its lead editorial today, on recognition of the NLF as the sole representative of the people of South Vietnam. And this, as the Post says, is tantamount to insisting upon unconditional surrender by the United States and the South Vietnamese.

It is a surrender that would abandon American commitments now and imperil American ability, in the future, to continue any effective resistance to Communist aggression on the Asian mainland—

The Post continued. Its point was emphasized by a second offering, written from Bangkok by Joseph Alsop. This column clearly points up the present danger to Thailand, the next target in the Communist drive to capture all of southeast Asia. Preparations for the attempted takeover, Alsop writes, are "undoubtedly, well established facts." And, he adds:

There can be no doubt that the shock of an American retreat and surrender in Vietnam would open the door wide for this attempted Communist takeover.

I ask unanimous consent that both the lead editorial from today's Washington Post and Mr. Alsop's column be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEAKING OF SURRENDER

It is being widely argued by those who oppose the Government's policies in South Vietnam that we are making the surrender of North Vietnam a condition to negotiations. What the United States is asking of North Vietnam is the cessation of the aggression against South Vietnam—and that does not require any loss of territory, surrender of forces, or impairment of sovereignty.

When North Vietnam insists that the United States recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the people of South Vietnam, however, it itself is asking for a surrender—an unconditional surrender by the United States and the South Vietnamese. On January 24, Ho Chi Minh sent to 14 Communist countries and other interested parties, the letter explicitly making this condition. He said:

"If the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam [the political arm of the Vietcong] as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it."

It is remarkable that this language has not been recognized by everyone as the equivalent of a surrender ultimatum. The NLF, from the beginning, has been only an arm

of North Vietnam. As an Australian Government study pointed out last summer: "The National Liberation Front for the liberation of South Vietnam was established as the instrumentality of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party, itself the governing party of North Vietnam." New Zealand's white paper on Vietnam pointed out: "The Vietcong military and political apparatus in South Vietnam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Vietnam." It concludes that "North Vietnam has committed aggression against the Republic of Vietnam under the guise of a 'war of national liberation'."

It cannot be denied that the NLF, directed from Hanoi, has been able to get numbers of South Vietnamese to join the Vietcong. But it is an organization conceived in Hanoi, as an arm of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, and as an instrument of the North Vietnam state. Were the United States to agree to recognize the NLF as the "sole" representative of South Vietnam, it would be tantamount to recognizing the Government of North Vietnam as the "sole" representative of South Vietnam. That, obviously, would be a total surrender.

One could look at such a capitulation in two ways. Those who say we have no stake in Asia and should never have intervened in South Vietnam, still would have to acknowledge that we did intervene and that we made clear commitments of our power by congressional enactment, by treaty and by the declaration of authorized officials. Capitulation of this kind would betray those commitments.

Those who admit we have a stake in Asia and an interest in containing communism there would have to acknowledge the infinite calamity of (in practical effect) surrendering in the field a force of 700,000 men willing to fight on our side in the continuing struggle against aggression in Asia. And that would be but the beginning of our losses. Many others now willing to fight with us, in the face of our withdrawal in South Vietnam, surely would make their accommodation with the forces of aggression on the Asian mainland.

The administration has been reproached for not mobilizing in Asia the sort of an international concert of powers we formed to contain Communist aggression in Europe. We ought to have more allies and more contributions from the allies we have. But we may be sure that whatever international help we now have, we would have less help and fewer allies from now on, in containing Communist aggression in Asia, if we withdrew from South Vietnam under conditions amounting to a surrender.

The power that is demanding a "surrender" in South Vietnam is North Vietnam, when it asks that we recognize the NLF as the "sole" representative of the South Vietnamese people. It is a surrender that would abandon American commitments now and imperil American ability, in the future, to continue any effective resistance to Communist aggression on the Asian mainland.

MATTER OF FACT: ON A THEME FROM KENNAN (By Joseph Alsop)

BANGKOK.—Nearly 16 years ago, George F. Kennan, working at fever heat, dashed off the first draft of a famous policy paper. On the basis of the arguments therein set forth, President Truman made his magnificently courageous Korean decision, and a long chain reaction of Asian disasters was thus averted, albeit at heavy cost.

If one can trust the transmitted versions of Kennan's recent Senate testimony, he has by now forgotten just about all the arguments he assembled for presentation at the Korea meetings at Blair House. But with regard to this country, he is at least quoted

as admitting that an American retreat and surrender in Vietnam would have an "unfortunate" effect.

"Unfortunate" is a pretty mild word for the reality. The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, has quite openly described Thailand as "next" on the agenda after Vietnam to at least one Western visitor in Peking. And the preparations for an assault on Thailand's independence are quite plain for anyone to see.

In order to grasp the nature of these preparations, it is first of all necessary to grasp the basic facts of Thailand's geography. Briefly, the mountainous northeastern part of the country and the southern provinces on the Malay Peninsula are both fairly inaccessible from the center, and both regions have non-Thai populations.

The northeast, with its Lao and Vietnamese inhabitants, and the extreme south, with its Malays, have therefore been selected as the prime targets by the Communist planners in Peking and Hanoi. In the southern provinces, a base was provided by the Communist guerrillas who fled into the Thai jungles after the failure of the assault on Malaya. In the northeast, the Vietnamese who fled to Thailand during the French war also offered useful human raw material.

A good deal has already been published about this Communist effort in Thailand. But its coldly calculated character has never been well conveyed. In the southern provinces, for instance, secret jungle camps were organized, where recruits from the villages were intensively trained by the refugees from the Malayan war.

Many scores of recruits from the northeastern provinces were also conveyed in secret into the parts of Laos controlled by the North Vietnamese Army (from which solemn treaty obligations of course required the North Vietnamese troops to be totally withdrawn 4 years ago). A hundred or so of the most important agents were even taken by sea to Hong Kong, and thence into China, for advanced training.

In this manner, quite serious though still limited guerrilla movements have by now been organized in both the target areas. The ruthless terrorism that is such a characteristic feature of "liberation" movements, has begun on a considerable scale. In short, the pattern is clear, down to the last detail.

As of now, it is not an especially alarming pattern, since the Thai Government has organized energetic countermeasures. But let the United States take the advice of George Kennan and his friends. Let the Vietnamese war end in a retreat and a surrender. Then anyone with the smallest knowledge of Asian affairs can foresee that the effect in Thailand will be quite dramatically "unfortunate."

To be sure, Senator FULBRIGHT's anti-administration witnesses do not seem to have included many persons with any knowledge whatever of Asia. If one may judge from this distance, a good specimen witness was Prof. Hans Morgenthau, whose errors of basic historical fact, concerning southeast Asia have been so crude and glaring that his pose as an expert is in the nature of a comic turn.

Yet the double standard that now prevails is still a bit bewildering. Think, for instance, of the outcry that would be heard from people of Morgenthau's stamp, if the CIA were discovered to be attempting in North Korea, or even in North Vietnam, anything comparable to what the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists are quite openly attempting here in Thailand.

Even more bewildering, one must add, is the total carelessness of consequences and the flat refusal to face unpleasant facts. For these preparations for an attempted takeover in Thailand, please remember, are undoubted, well-established facts. And there can be no doubt that the shock of an American retreat and surrender in Vietnam would open the door wide for this attempted Communist takeover.